Musk is half-correct. While an FTO designation does not provide a specific legal or political authority for the US government to use force against cartels, it provides two related benefits. First, it provides an important contextual finding to support a later decision to use force. In essence, it allows Trump to tell Congress: “I used force against what my administration has found to be a terrorist organisation that significantly threatens US national security.” Second, it provides supporting evidence to Trump in the event that he wishes to issue a covert action finding against any of the FTO listed cartels.
That covert action finding, which has likely already been issued, is the critical element related to possible drone strikes. The immediate impact of an FTO is to make illegal any transaction or material engagement by US persons with a cartel or affiliated operations. This will have a significant impact on US engagement with Mexican businesses that have proximity to cartels, of which there are many.
Covert action findings allow a president to authorise deniable or “covert” use of force, or other levers of hostile manipulation, against a designated entity. Highly secretive, they are briefed only to the so-called “Gang of Eight” ranking members of the Congressional leadership and Intelligence Committees. Trump has offered numerous hints that he would issue a covert action finding, including via his selection of a former CIA paramilitary operations officer as his new Ambassador to Mexico.
The CIA would take the lead in terms of any direct action against cartels. Sentiment inside the CIA is heavily supportive of more aggressive use of force in light of casualties officers and agents have suffered at the hands of those groups in recent years. Covert action would be expected to entail blackmail, influence, kidnapping, and assassination actions against cartel officers and their enablers in Mexico’s security and political apparatus. Because of the obvious political risks of targeting powerful Mexican government officials or their interests (Mexico’s ruling Morena party is viewed by US intelligence services as retaining close links to the Sinaloa Cartel, for example), Trump’s appetite for risk will be the key element in shaping how far the CIA is allowed to go.
Drone strikes could certainly form part of the covert action campaign. Indeed, the Trump administration has already escalated the activity of CIA operated MQ-9 Reaper drone flights over Mexico. And while these drones are not involved in combat action thus far, they could easily be loaded with weapons to enable that capability. Media leaks of these flights appear designed to pressure the Mexican government to take more robust measures to confront the cartels or face the cartels suffering direct US confrontation.
Based on Trump’s priority to reduce fentanyl smuggling into the US, we should expect drone strikes and other actions to occur in the coming months.